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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Insanity
An appeal from a conviction of First Degree Murder presented to the Court 7
a question of the sufficiency of the explanation given to the jury by the trial court
of section 1120 of the New York Penal Law.05 The eighteen year old defendant, an
unstable homosexual, murdered his father, who evidently had made his life miser-
able. There was no question of premeditation, since the murder had been well
planned. After hearing a lengthly parade of psychiatrists, the jury chose to believe
the prosecution's experts and found defendant guilty. Defendant unsuccessfully
sought a new trial on numerous grounds, one of which elicited a dissent by Judge
Van Voorhis.
A defense psychiatrist had testified on direct examination that defendant, due
to his delusional motivation, was incapable of distinguishing right from wrong.
On cross examination the psychiatrist was not allowed to qualify his answers to
indicate that defendant's delusions made him incapable of understanding that his
act was "morally" wrong.69 Coupled with this was the court's failure when charging
'he jury clearly to instruct that defendant should be found insane if intellectually
or morally he did not know that his act was wrong.70 The defense contended that
the combination of the court's ruling on cross examination and the inadequate
charge left the jury with the impression that they were not to consider defend-
ant's alleged moral blindness. 71
67. People v. Horton, 308 N. Y. 1, 123 N. E. 2d 609 (1954).
68. N. Y. PENAL LAW §1120: "A person is ... excused from criminal liability
as an... insanse person... upon proof that... he was laboring under such a
defect of reason as: (1) Not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing; or, (2) Not to know that the act was wrong."
69. "Q. Doctor, did he know what he was doing when he committed those
acts? A. The answer is no. He was psychotic at the time and did not know the
nature and quality of his acts." In response to a similar question, "No, he was
in a schizophrenic state.", and to the next question the doctor said that he was
still responding to his delusional idea. Then followed this exchange: "Q. You
concede, then, Doctor, that this series of connected activities seemed to be ra-
tional? A. Seemed to be rational just as the case of paranoid praecox. They are a
whole series of connected activities, yet they are a most serious and most malig-
nant form of schizophrenia. Just the ability to rationalize doesn't make It ra-
tional." In all these answers all qualifications were stricken and the jury was
instructed to disregard all but the "yes" or "no" part of the answer. 308 N. Y.
At 20, 123 N. E. 2d. at 614.
70. That such is the law in New York, see People v. Schmidt, 216 N. Y. 324,
333-334, 110 N. E. 945, 947 (1915), where Judge Cardozo referred to M'Naghten's
Case, 10 Cl. & F. 200 (1843), as follows: "The judges expressly held that a de-
fendant who knew nothing of the law would none the less be responsible If he
knew that the act was wrong, by which, therefore, they must have meant, if he
knew thAt it was morally wrong . . .There is nothing to justify the belief that
the words right and wrong, when they became limited by M'N~aghten's case to
the right and wrong of the particular act, cast off their meaning as terms of
morals, and became terms of pure legality."
71. People v. Taylor, 138 N. Y. 398, 34 N. E. 275 (1893); People v. Ferraro,
161 N. Y. 365, 55 N. E. 931 (1900); People v. Sherwood, 271 N. Y. 427, 3 N. E, 2d
581 (1936).
THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1954 TERM
The majority thought that the extensive psychiatric testimony elicited in the
case clearly presented the question, and had been weighed and rejected by the
jury. The dissent opined that forcing the defense psychiatrist to give categorical
answers created the impression that defendant's alleged delusions, though they
convinced him that his act was not morally wrong, were still not wthin the defi-
nition of section 1120.
The dissent stated that the court's charge on the insanity question was a bare
reading of the applicable section of the Penal Law.7 2 In such case the judge's failure
to explain the proper interpretation of "wrong" should in itself be valid ground
for reversal.
Pablic Trial
The cynosure of the tabloids, People v. Jelke,73 presented the question of
whether a trial judge can exclude, over defendant's objection, the press and idle
spectators from a compulsory prostitution trial.74 The court held the right of
"public trial" 75 to be such a basic privilege that a trial judge has discretion to
exclude only in those instances enumerated in section four of the Judiciary Law,70
and anticipation of filthy and indecent testimony is not sufficient. A persuasive
dissent by Judges Desmond and Conway refused to concede that tradition compels
allowing the public admittance to "sex trials."77 They argued that the public trial
requirement has always been subject to the inherent power of the trial court to
exclude in order to facilitate the testimony of emotionally disturbed witnesses,78 or
to limit their number to prevent overcrowding or disorder.79 Therefore, this right
72. That the charge should be illuminated by reference to the evidence in
the case, so that the jury can properly apply the law to the facts, see People v.
Fanning, 131 N. Y. 659, 30 N. E. 569 (1892); People v. Becker, 210 N. Y. 274, 104
N. E. 396 (1914).
73. 308 N. Y. 56, 123 N. E. 2d 769 (1954).
74. N. Y. PENAL LAV §2460.
75. N. Y. JUDICIAiY LAW §4, provides: "The sittings of every court within
this state shall be public, and every citizen may freely attend the same, except
that in all proceedings and trials in cases for divorce, seduction, bastardy or
filiation, the court may, in its discretion, exclude therefrom all persons who are
not directly interested therein, excepting jurors, witnesses, and officers of the
court."
N. Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAW §12, provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused
has a right to a speedy and public trial . . ."
N. Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. §8, provides: "In a criminal action the defendant is en-
titled (1) To a speedy and public trial . .
76. Supra, note .75.
77. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 379 (6th ed. 1890); ABBOTT, TRA.L
BRIEF, CRIMINAL CAUSES, §157 (1st ed. 1889); 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 338 (3d ed.
1940). See People v. Hall, 51 App. Div. 57, 64 N. Y. Supp. 433 (4th Dep't 1900).
78, Hogan v. State, 191 Ark. 437, 86 S. W. 2d 931 (1935); Moore v. State,
151 Ga. 648, 108 S. E. 47 (1921); State v. Damm, 62 S. D. 123, 252 N. W. 7 (1933);
State ex rel. Baker v. Utecht, 22 Minn. 145, 149, 21 N. W. 2d 328, 331 (1946).
79. People v. Miller, 257 N. Y. 54, 60, 177 N. E. 306, 308 (1931); Reagan v.
United States, 202 Fed. 488, 489-490 (9th Cir. 1913).
